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The evolution of human cooperation is a long-standing puzzle that has received much recent attention. Research has focused on three nested questions. First: how can altruistic behavior survive evolutionary pressures at all (Hamilton, 1964a A number of compelling arguments have been forwarded for resolving the first two questions. These include: kin selection and inclusive fitness (Hamilton, 1964a,b) ; reciprocal altruism (Trivers, 1971; Axelrod, 1984) ; altruistic punishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Henrich and Boyd, 2001 ) and reputation The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 considers a completely standard finitely repeated public goods game (n player Prisoners' Dilemma) model of evolutionary dynamics. In this game, reciprocal altruists compete with unconditional defectors, as in Cohen and Eshel (1976) . Evolutionary dynamics can support cooperation in small groups in this model, but, as in Boyd and Richerson (1988) , cooperation becomes unsustainable as group size grows. Section 3 then tweaks the model by replacing the unconditional defectors with non-cooperative agents who are more recognizably human: they are intrinsically non-cooperative in the sense that they are purely self-interested, but they play strategically. So, even though they are not intrinsically cooperative, they can behave cooperatively when it is in their own selfish best interest. This simple modification completely reverses the standard result: identical evolutionary dynamics not only can support cooperative behavior in large groups, but cooperative behavior is actually ensured in sufficiently large groups. 
The Evolutionary Model
The evolutionary model is a version of the Haystack model (Maynard- Smith, 1964 ). Each generation t consists of a unit measure of individuals. Individuals are sorted randomly (non-assortatively) into groups (the haystacks) with n players. The n individuals within each group play an M times repeated public goods game. At the end of the M periods, generation t individuals reproduce asexually. The fraction of generation t + 1 players who are the offspring of a given generation t individual is proportional to the generation t individual's M-period payoff. The generation t + 1 individuals are then assigned randomly to new groups (haystacks) of size n, play the repeated public goods game, reproduce... and so on.
In each of the M periods of the public goods, each of the n individuals chooses whether to cooperate (C) or to defect (D). If j individuals play C in a given period, those who cooperate and those who defect receive period payoffs of βj and βj + 1, respectively. The interpretation is that each player has a unit endowment which she can consume (playing D) or contribute to a public good (playing C). The latter strategy provides a benefit β to each individual in the group, including herself. Contributions are assumed to be socially productive (βn > 1) but individually harmful (β < 1). For technical reasons, β is further assumed to satisfy the slightly stronger condition: βn ≥ (2 − β) > 1.
Individuals' strategies are determined by their genetic "type," which is transmitted without mutation from parent to child. (The no-mutation assumption is inessential but expositionally convenient.) Specifying the set of "types" de- 
Payoffs
Let j index the number of T -types in a given group. All individuals will cooperate in all n periods in groups with j = n. In groups with j < n, the j T -types will cooperate in period 1, the (n − j) U-types will defect in period 1, and all individuals will defect in periods 2, · · · , M. Payoffs u T (j) and u U (j) to T and U types are therefore given as follows:
For notational ease, define u U (n) = 0 and u T (0) = M − 1. Then u U (j) = 2 Boyd and Richerson (1988) consider generalized T -types who cooperate so long as fewer than a members defected in the preceding period. Allowing for these types is expositionally more cumbersome, but it does not materially affect the results.
u T (j) + 1 for all j.
Dynamics
Let p t denote the fraction of T types in generation t. Random assignment implies that the fraction of generation t individuals who are in groups with j T -types is given by the binomial density,
It will also be useful to use the cumulative distribution function (the proportion of the population in groups with no more than j types): 
(These are simply the "replicator" dynamics described in, e.g., Taylor and Jonker (1978) .) Theorem 1 summarizes the properties of these dynamics.
Theorem 1 (Baseline Dynamics)
The mapping D n described in Equation The next section modifies this simple model in order to illustrate a potential resolution of this puzzle.
A Modified Model with Homo Sapiens
The baseline model has two types: the intrinsically cooperative Tit-for- Tats 
Types
Tit-for-Tat types are exactly as in the baseline model. The new genotypically non-cooperative types are now strategic (S)-types: they are the perfectly rational, forward looking players of standard non-cooperative game theory. Type is common knowledge within a given group. 3 Section 4 discusses the robustness of the conclusions to these assumptions. In particular, it notes that for low numbers of repetitions M , "perfect rationality" is a much stronger assumption than is necessary for the results to hold.
Payoffs
Payoffs are determined by a subgame perfect equilibria (SPE; Selten, 1965) .
Define j * = min{j|j ≥ (1 − β)/β} and consider the following strategies:
• If j < j * : defect in every period.
•
These strategies describe the highest payoff SPE of the game. 
then backwards induction reveals that "defect in every period" is the unique SPE strategy for strategic types. Hence, the proposed strategies constitute a SPE, and no other SPE can involve more cooperation.
Taking this "best" SPE to be outcome of the game, 4 the M-period payoffs as a function of the number j of T -types in a group are given by:
For notational convenience, (5) implicitly uses u T (0) = M−1 and u S (n) = Mβn + 1,
Dynamics
Other than the different payoffs to the two types, evolutionary dynamics are the same as in the baseline model. Let p t denote the fraction of T -types in generation t, let f (n, j, p t ) be defined as in Equation (2), and letD n denote the mapping p t → p t+1 , i.e.,
The following theorem summarizes the key properties of this mapping. A formal proof appears in the Appendix.
Theorem 3 (Modified Dynamics)
The points p = 0 and p = 1 are fixed points of the mappingD n . Point p is unstable; point p is stable. Furthermore:
is monotone in t: the sequence is either non-increasing for all t or else is non-decreasing for all t.
[Insert figure 2 (a) and (b) around here]
Properties (1) and (2) of Theorem 3 state that the evolutionary dynamics are "nice" in the sense that the fraction of T -types will converge monotonically to some stable level (which may depend on the initial fraction of T -types).
Panel Simulations suggest that the dynamics for sufficiently large n always have the same qualitative two-basin-of-attraction structure. They also indicate that the interior "peak" visible in both panels of Figure 2 occurs near j * n -the "critical fraction" of T -types required for cooperation-and that the peak gets narrower and narrower as n grows.
5 It thus appears to be true that there is a unique 5 If − dF (n,j,p) dp is a single peaked function of p-which seems intuitively correct and has been borne out by all simulations, but for which there is no obvious proof-then stable interior fixed point p * with the following properties: (a) for sufficiently large n it is always to the right of . Hence, as n grows, the basin of attraction of all fixed points with surviving T -types converges to (0, 1), and the survival of some T -types is ensured.
It follows that the T -types' survival is ensured in large groups-though apparently only as small fractions of large groups. As the following corollary establishes, however, the genotypically cooperative T -types survive in sufficient numbers to ensure that cooperative behavior is the norm in large groups.
It asserts formally that, starting from any initial fraction of T -types, most groups in every generation will be cooperative-in the sense that all individuals in these groups will cooperate in periods 1, ..., M − 1-so long as the group size is sufficiently large. The formal proof is provided in the Appendix.
Corollary 4 (Survival of Cooperation in Large Groups) For any
this topological structure on the dynamics would follow easily. 
Discussion and Caveats
The difference between Corollaries 2 and 4 is striking: for a fixed p 0 , the former states that cooperation is completely eviscerated in sufficiently large groups; the latter states that cooperative behavior becomes the norm in large groups.
The intuition behind this reversal is straightforward. As formalized by Price (1970), the long-run evolutionary stability of cooperation is determined by a horse-race between "within group" effects, which favor the genotypically noncooperative types and "between group" effects, which favor groups with more genotypically cooperative T -types. The evisceration of cooperation formalized in baseline model obtains because the number of T -types needed to sustain cooperative behavior in any given group grows with the size of the group.
Groups with sufficiently many T -types become increasingly rare as group size grows, so the between-group effects become negligible.
In the modified model, by contrast, the fraction of T -types required to sustain cooperative behavior in a given group decreases with group size. This is because only a small number (j * ) of T -types in a group is needed to induce strategic cooperation by the self-interested S-types. Combined with the growing gross public benefit of cooperation (i.e., βn − 1), this ensures that between-group evolutionary forces come to dominate as group size grows.
This intuition makes it clear that the reversal is robust to several modifications, such as allowing Tit-for-Tat types to have some (fixed or slowly growing)
tolerance for the number of defectors, or having the public benefit β decrease with group size (so long as the gross public benefit of pro-social behavior grows sufficiently quickly). Similarly, the qualitative results are robust to the introduction of a small exogenous probability of "mutation" to the opposite type during reproduction.
A number of other modeling assumptions raise potentially more significant concerns about the practical interpretation the results. First, one might worry that invoking subgame perfection requires endowing strategic types with an implausible amount of rationality. Second, Section 3 takes type to be observable.
Since observability plays a critical role in generating cooperation in groups with strategic players, it is important explore the extent to which the result hinges on this assumption. Third, the joint assumptions of a continuum of individuals and a deterministic environment rule out the possibility of "accidental" extinction of the genotypically cooperative T -types via drift. This is a particular concern since the fraction of T -types in the interior equilibrium identified in Theorem 3 shrinks to zero as the group size n grows.
We consider each of these concerns in turn.
Rationality Assumptions
The baseline model of Section 2 departs from Boyd and Richerson's (1988) model by assuming that the number of repetitions of the game M is finite rather than infinite. With non-rational actors, this distinction is unimportant.
With strategic actors it is.
Although formal results that are qualitatively similar to those in Section 3 could be derived in an infinitely repeated version of the model, the finitely repeated version relies on substantially less stringent cognitive capability assumptions for equilibrium play. When M = 2, for example, the proposed equilibrium requires only that strategic types are able to calculate one period ahead (and second order mutual knowledge of this fact and of rationality). This is far less restrictive than the "common knowledge of rationality" assumption that would be required to ensure equilibrium in the infinitely repeated version.
Qualitatively, with finite repetitions, strategic types only have to be homo sapiens, not homo economicus.
Observability of Type
The assumption that type is perfectly observable is analytically important:
it is what allows strategic types to condition their play on the number of genotypically cooperative T -types in their group. After discussing the extent to which it is conceptually important, this section describes how and when allowing self-reporting can replace the observability assumption.
Consequences of Relaxing Observability
To highlight the importance of the observability assumption, consider a polar opposite case: type is completely unobservable and strategic types know only the population fraction p of T -types.
On the one hand, individual behavior here is quite similar to behavior in the "perfect observability" case: as in Kreps et al. (1982) , there is a (Bayesian) equilibrium with the property that, for sufficiently large p, strategic types cooperate with high probability in most rounds of the game. Since cooperation is probabilistic in this equilibrium, cooperation will, on average, be higher in groups with more cooperative T -types, just as in the perfect observability case.
On the other hand, the evolutionary dynamics are much different: they inevitably lead to complete evisceration of cooperation. Observability confers a distinct disadvantage on S-types, since it can lead to the unraveling of cooperative behavior as other S-types anticipate the last-round defections (and then penultimate round defections, etc...). Removing observability ensures that Stypes will achieve at least weakly, and sometimes strictly higher payoffs than T -types (since they can always imitate T -types).
Whether or not evolutionary forces with intermediate levels of observability will generally eviscerate cooperation is an open-and analytically challengingquestion. Suppose, for example, type is observable, but there is some positive probability of "recognition" errors. Then groups with more T -types will be more likely to be cooperative than groups with fewer-just as in the "perfect observability" case. This induces the qualitative correlation between group composition and group payoff that is necessary for between group forces to potentially overwhelm within group forces. At the same time, imperfect observability blurs the sharp cutoff at j * between cooperation and the lack thereof, reducing the quantitative magnitude of this correlation. Monte Carlo simulations indicate that that the "perfect observability" dynamics are robust to the introduction of modest recognition errors for a fixed group size. Whether or not a fixed error rate undermines cooperation in sufficiently large groups remains an open question.
Self-Revelation of Type
One might hope to rely on self-reporting of type rather than assuming observability. This can be modeled by looking for a truth-telling equilibrium in a pre-game round wherein each individual in a group simultaneously states his type, and where play in the M-round repeated game then follows the equilibrium strategies from Section 3 (with the reported number j of T -types).
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If deception is costless and impossible to observe, then truth telling is not an equilibrium, since if (and only if) a strategic type happens to be in a group with exactly j * −1 T -types, unilateral mis-reporting by an S-types will improve his payoff by inducing cooperation in rounds 1, · · · , M − 1 by his opponents. Now suppose deception involves some small cost ε(n) and that there is some probability P (n, j) of a group successfully "sniffing out" a deception. The gross benefit of unilaterally misreporting is:
Expression (7) assumes that an unsuccessful deception leads the group to play according to the true rather than the reported j. The first term is the probability of not being sniffed out. The second term is the probability of being in a group with exactly j * − 1 individuals (the only time successful unilateral deception matters). The third term is the benefit conditional on being in such a group and successfully deceiving; it is computed under the assumption that an S-type who gets away with deception subsequently cooperates in periods 1, ..., M − 2 and defects in M − 1 and M (which is optimal).
Since f (n, j
is finite, the cost of deception will outweigh the expected benefit in large groups whenever
grows slightly faster than n. In this case, engaging in deception will be undesirable for sufficiently large n, and the central results of Section 3 will continue to hold. This condition is plausible. It will hold, for example, if ε is independent of n and each strategic type has an independent and arbitrarily small probability η > 0 of sniffing out a defection. Alternatively, it will hold if deception has a per group member cost and if the likelihood of detection increases, even arbitrarily slowly, with n.
Drift
Focusing on a model with a continuum of individuals is analytically convenient. One might reasonably have concerns about the appropriateness of this abstraction, however, especially since the population fraction of T -types in the interior fixed point identified in Corollary 4 shrinks zero as group size grows. In particular, random fluctuations could reduce the realized fraction of T -types in a given generation into the basin of attraction of the steady state at p = 0 (viz Figure 2 ) and lead to their eventual extinction.
A back of the envelope calculation is useful for assessing the quantitative importance of this concern. A generous time-frame for human evolution is on the order of 100,000 generations. To have a better than 50% chance of surviving this long, the probability of extinction in any given generation should be less than approximately 10 −5 . So if fluctuations large enough to eliminate T -types in a given generation are "5-sigma" events, then they are not quantitatively problematic.
Consider mean-zero shocks which cause the realized fraction of p of T -types in a given generation to be approximately normally distributed around the expected value p * (i.e., the interior equilibrium). If the stochasticity is individualspecific, the variance of this distribution will scale as η/(p * N), where N is the total population size, and η is a measure of the individual-level fluctuations, which we conservatively take to be 1. 7 (For a concrete example, suppose that each T -type "birth" has a probability η/2 each of producing twins or of being stillborn.)
Extinction of T -types will result if random fluctuations lead their population fraction to fall below (1 − α)p * for some α. (In Figure 2 , α = p p * .) This will be 7 Focusing on individual-specific shocks is reasonable here since the aggregate population shocks that uniformly both T -and S-types will not affect p.
a 5-sigma event when: population N is on the order of 500, 000. For b = 4 and n = 100 and 1000, drift is unproblematic even for N = 20, 000 and N = 100, 000, respectively. So the drift-free model appears to be a reasonable abstraction.
Conclusions
Theorem 3 and its corollary show how the received wisdom that cooperative behavior is evolutionarily unstable in large groups is highly sensitive to modeling assumptions: simply replacing the biological automata of standard models with forward-looking strategic players, cooperation in large groups becomes the norm, completely overturning standard "impossibility of cooperation large groups" results. Though suggestive, the results herein can hardly be regarded as dispositive regarding the evolutionary causes of human cooperation: the model on which they are based is simply too stylized.
9
Instead, the central results of this paper are best viewed as illustrative of two important ideas. First, the potential importance of human facultative reasoning skills-arguably the defining characteristic of homo sapiens-should receive greater emphasis in explanations of why our species is essentially unique in exhibiting large scale cooperation among unrelated individuals. But this explanation is probably best viewed as a complement to rather than a substitute for other recently proposed resolutions of the puzzle of human exceptionalism. 10 Gintis (2000), for example, argues that the combination of strong reciprocity (punishment of non-cooperative behavior) and uniquely human abilities which make punishment "cheaper" (such as tool-making, hunting ability, likely to be the norm in real-world dynamical processes. 10 Even if it were the explanation for large scale human cooperation, sapience would't fully resolve the "puzzle" of human exceptionalism; it merely reduces the question to why our sapience is exceptional.
and stone throwing) can help to resolve it. 11 It seems likely that strategic punishment by sapient types-the analog of strategic cooperation-would further enhance the evolutionary case for strong reciprocity.
Bowles (2006) Define global average payoffs
The variance and expected value of j are
and n j=0 (jf (n, j, p t )) = np t , respectively, and f (n, n, p t ) = p n t . We can therefore re-write Equation (10) as
Denote the right-hand-side of Equation (11) 
is a continuous function of p t with three real zeros at p = 0, p = 1 and p = p * . Our assumption that n > (2 − β)/β ensures p * ∈ (0, 1). Also,
, completing the proof.
PROOF.
[Proof of Theorem 3] As in the proof of Theorem 1, define global average payoffsū t and note that:
where the last step uses the following two observations:
df (n,j,p) dp
(as is easily verified by direct computation).
This directly confirms the (obvious) fact that p = 0 and p = 1 are fixed points.
When p t ∈ (0, 1), the sign of p t+1 − p t is equal to the sign of
The first term is strictly negative, and independent of p t . The second term is strictly positive. The stability properties will follow by establishing that
Stability properties of p and p: For p t ≈ 1:
(plus higher order terms in (1 − p) ; intuitively, the tails of the binomial distribution fall off fast, so the bulk of the mass to the left of j * is concentrated at j * − 1.) Since n − j * + 1 ≥ 2 (which follows from βn > 2 − β > 1), dF (n,j * −1,pt) dp → 0 as p → 1. Similarly, dF (n,j * −1,pt) dp → 0 as p t → 0. We conclude that p t+1 − p t is negative as p t → 0 or p t → 1, so that p and p are stable and unstable, respectively.
Existence of (monotone) limits (Properties (1) and (2)): It is straightforward to establish from Equations (5) and (6) (e.g., with some tedious alge-
Taking for all n ≥ N; Property (3) will then follow directly from the monotonicity of the dynamics.
Explicitly computing: 
